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Fairness across Borders:
The Barsebdick Nuclear Power Plant*
Ragnar E. Lbfstedt**
Since 1992, Sweden and Denmark have faced a diplomatic problem
over nuclear reactors at Barseback in southern Sweden, less than 20KM
from Copenhagen. Danes feel that it was built too close to densely
populated areas and they would be affected by any accident. Swedes
argue that acid rain from Danish coal-powered plants falling over
southern Sweden poses equally serious problems. This paper discusses
the history of this controversy, its escalation and possible solutions.
Theoretical Tools
The concepts of process and outcome fairness and preference

reversal will be used to analyse the issues.
The fairness concept can be applied to siting issues I and to
transnational controversies in environmental negotiation. 2 Studies

have shown that such disputes cannot be resolved without reference to
3
what is viewed as fair by conflicting parties.
* The author thanks Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer, Laura Kelly, Howard Kunreuther,
Jerry Ravetz, Ortwin Renn and Anna Vari - as well as utility, ministry and
environmental NGO spokespeople in both Sweden and Denmark for information and
comments on earlier drafts.
This study was carried out while the author was a research fellow at the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), supported by a grant
from the Swedish Council for the Planning and Coordination of Research (FRN). His

views do not necessarily reflect those of either ILASA or FRN.

** Dr Li~fstedt is a Lecturer in Social Geography at the Risk Research Group, Centre
for Environmental Strategy, University of Surrey (UK). He received his BA
(Geography) from UCLA, and MA. and Ph.D. (Geography) from Clark University.
1 Howard Kunreuther, Kevin Fitzgerald & Thomas D. Aarts, Siting Noxious
Facilities:A Test of the Facility Siting Credo, 13 Risk Anal. 301 (1993); also the
following presented at the 1994 IIASA workshop: Howard Kunreuther, Paul Slovic &
Donald MacGregor, Risk Perception and Trust: Challenges for Facility Siting and
Risk Management, Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer & Benjamin Davy, Hazardous Waste
Cleanup and Facility Siting in Central Europe: the Austrian Case; and Ortwin Renn,
Thomas Webler & Hans Kastenholz, Fairness and Competence in Siting a Landfill:
A Case Study from Switzerland.
2 Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer, Fairness in Dealing with Transboundary
EnvironmentalRisks, Unpublished (1995).
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The concept of fairness in a negotiating context has structural,
process, procedural and outcome components. 4 Structural fairness
refers to the make-up of the negotiation process, i.e., the negotiating
parties, the complexity of the issues that are being negotiated, the rules
5
and codes guiding the negotiation process, and its logistics.
Process fairness concerns itself with whether negotiating parties
perceive that they are treating each other fairly and, related to this, how
their perceived views of the future outcome fairness may influence the
6
negotiation process.
Different types of negotiating tools make up the concept of
procedural fairness. Procedures considered fair include concepts such as
equal sacrifices or "tit-for-tat" solutions 7 or fair chance procedures,
8
such as arranging a lottery.
Outcome fairness is concerned with principles underlying the
allocation of burdens and benefits within the agreement itself. 9 Three
allocation principles most often discussed are equality, equity and

justice.

10

Studies on siting indicate that people frequently reverse preferences
when they realize that a selection procedure to which they have agreed
turns out to victimize them. 11 In such cases they try to explain obvious
inconsistencies by referring to incomplete knowledge at the time of the
original decision, unfair implementation of the agreed upon selection
12
rule, or the advent of new circumstances.
Id.
Cecilia Albin, The Role of Fairness in Negotiation, 9 NegotiationJ. 223 (1993).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Daniel Druckman & T.V. Bonoma, Determinants of BargainingBehaviour in a
BilateralMonopoly Situation.... 21 Behav. Sci. 252 (1976).
8 H. Peyton Young, Equity. In Theory and Practice (1994).
3
4

9 Id. and Albin, supra note 4.
10 Morton Deutsch, Equity, Equality, and Need: What Determines Which Value
Will Be Used as the Basis of DistributiveJustice? 31 J. Soc. Issues 137 (1975); and

Young, supra note 8.

11 Bruno S. Frey, Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Reiner Eiclfenberger, Old Lady Visits
Your Backyard - A Tale of Morals and Markets, unpublished (1994).
12 Id.
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Historical Context of the Barseb~ick Controversy
The controversy surrounding the BarsebIck plant has been a source
of political and public dispute since the two reactors came on-line in the
mid-70's. To understand and analyse the situation, and draw possible
solutions, it is necessary to look briefly at the history behind the
planning and the building of the plant.
From the period when Sydkraft (the utility that built and operates
Barseb~ick) presented the plans of a nuclear power station in 1968 to
granting planning permission in 1970, Danish policy makers raised no
objections. The lack of opposition may be partly explained by Danish
plans for nuclear power. Until the mid-70's, Danish policy makers had
considered building nuclear reactors of their own, 13 and when
Barsebdck was being built, Sydkraft signed several electricity transfer
deals with their Danish counterparts. Hence, building the reactors so
close to Copenhagen could have been viewed by some Danes as an
opportunity to increase their knowledge of building and operating
14
nuclear power plants.
Yet, since the reactors first became operational, they have been a
source of political and public dispute. The plant was the focus of
domestic outrage during the 1976 "nuclear elections" and the site of
large demonstrations at the time of the 1980 Swedish nuclear
referendum. The Danes even passed a bill in parliament in 1986 calling
for its complete closure. In 1988, due to Danish pressure, Birgitta Dahl
of the Social Democratic Party, then Swedish Energy and
Environmental Minister, forced a bill through parliament calling for the
shut-down of two reactors by 1996, one from the Barseb~ick site. Only
three years later, this decision was revoked due to pressure from the
Liberal and Conservative parties and powerful trade-unions,
traditionally allied with the Social Democrats. Although this decision
caused concern among Danish policy makers, their reaction to the
plant's safety problems in 1992 and 1993 marked the low point in
Swedish-Danish relations over the plant.
On July 28 1992, during start-up of reactor II (following routine
maintenance), a water pipe broke, causing insulation to fall into the
13 Andrew Jamison et al., The Making of the New Environmental Consciousness
(1990).
14 Sven Bergqvist, De Hetatren (1985).
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water cooling system. The reactor's inlet filters were blocked within
twenty minutes but cleared again through a back-flooding mechanism.
A couple of months after the incident, SKI (the Swedish Nuclear
Inspectorate) ordered all reactors with similar filters to be shut down
and the filter systems redesigned. SKI felt that the system posed an
unacceptable risk of core meltdown.
Between the shutdown and the restart of the reactors, the Danish
Government, environmental NGO's, the Swedish Centre Party
(headed by the antinuclear Olof Johansson), and several other
influential Swedes (including the ex-Finance Minister, Kjell-Olof Feldt)
lobbied hard to close the plant permanently. 15 The Danes felt the
reactors should not have been built in the first place, since the plant not
only put Sweden's third largest city, Malm6, at risk, but also the
Danish capital with 1.3M inhabitants.
These arguments were not heeded. Sydkraft completed modifications to the filtering systems, and the reactors went back on line in
January 1993. This caused a massive outcry in Denmark. The Interior
Minister, Thor Pedersen, went so far as to suggest that the provinces
Sweden had captured from Denmark in 1658 (including Skne where
the Barseb~ick plant is located) should be retaken through military
means. Carl Bildt, then Swedish Prime Minister, felt that this statement
was extremely ill advised as it threatened Scandinavian cooperation
besides being ridiculous. 16 As sharp language failed to resolve the
conflict, a "war of humour" broke out. Anders Bj6rk, then Sweden's
Defence Minister, threatened to attack the Danes with fermented
herring, and journalists from the Danish newspaper, Ekstra Bladet,
17
dumped old smelly cheese at the Barseb~ick plant.
Negative Danish reaction was to be expected, considering that 83%
of Copenhagen's population is against nuclear power (70% in the rest of
Denmark) and that 82% of Danes wanted their government to pressure
18
Sweden to close the plant permanently.
15 Kjell-Olof Feldt et al., Fdrhindra ett Svenskt Ternobyl! Dagens Nyheter 20
Oct. 20, 1992, atA4.
16 Danskt Smil Retar Bildt, Dagens Nyheter, Jan. 7, 1993, at. AT.
17 Barsebdck Maltavala i Humorkrig,Dagens Nyheter, Jan. 11, 1993, at A5.
18 Anders Hellberg, Dansk oro Stoppar inte Barsebdck, Dagens Nyheter, Dec. 29,
1992, at A6.
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During the five month shutdown, the electricity short-fall was
made up through greater use of hydropower from northern Sweden
and fossil fuel plants in southern Sweden and Denmark. Over this
period, southern Sweden experienced a 10% increase in S0 2 and NOX
emissions causing increased acid rain. 19 The shutdown also resulted in
a loss of revenue for Sydkraft of 25M Crowns a week,20 as well as a
substantial profit for the Danish power companies generating the
replacement power for large parts of southern Sweden.
Methodology
An approach consisting of in-depth interviews and telephone surveys
was used. Malmbi and Copenhagen were selected for study as they both
have large populations approximately 20KM from Barsebdck and have
been centres of debate about the plant.
In-Depth Interviews
To understand the energy and environmental policy-making
climate in Stockholm and Copenhagen concerning Barsebadck, in-depth,
personal interviews were carried out with fifteen key politicians, seven
representatives from several of the major Danish and Swedish utility
companies (including Sydkraft), and eight representatives from various
environmental NGOs who were directly involved in the debate (e.g.,
Greenpeace Denmark and The Organization for Information about
Nuclear Power-OOA).
Random Telephone Questionnaire
A telephone survey of 100 randomly selected individuals in each
city was carried out to provide data about attitudes and perceptions
toward the plant and to see if the public agreed with policy makers.
Respondents were randomly selected fromthe current local telephone
directory, and response rates of 65% for Malm6 and 49% for
Copenhagen were obtained. Although the samples in both cities
roughly corresponded to socio-demographic breakdown of the city's
inhabitants as a whole, the male-female ratio for the Danish sample did
not. In the Copenhagen sample, 59 males and 41 females were
19 Stefan Leo, Surare i Kronoberg, Smalandsposten, Jan. 14, 1993, at 15.
20 Thomas Lerner, MiljardbesparingStdnga Barsebick, Dagens Nyheter, Dec. 3,
1992, at C2.
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interviewed, which based on previous research should skew the results in
a pronuclear direction as men have been shown to hold more pronuclear
21
views than women).
Results
The first three sections look at views of three main groups: policy
makers, the public and Sydkraft. Last, I discuss possible solutions.
PolicyMakers in the Two Countries
Swedish policy makers felt that process fairness was invoked during
the siting and building of the nuclear power plant, as their Danish
counterparts had been continuously consulted. In fact, the Danish
Government knew about Sydkraft's plans at Barseback before the local
population. According to Swedish policy makers, had the Danish
government complained as much about the plant when it was being
built as they do now, it would have been built elsewhere. But as no
complaints were raised, it is hard to see why Sydkraft should not have
built the plant where they did.
According to a local Swedish policy maker:
The Danes were consulted throughout the process. We
were nice to them. We even invited them to inspect the
plant. It is not our fault that Denmark's nuclear policy has
changed over time.... If they had made this fuss earlier we
would not have built the plant at Barseback.
That said, many policy makers realized that even if process fairness had
been achieved, outcome fairness had not.
I do understand the Danish view to a certain degree.
Although they receive benefits from Barsebick in the form
of cheap electricity [Swedish nuclear electricity is cheaper
than electricity produced from Denmark's coal plants], they
have no control over the reactor even when it is so close to
Copenhagen. (National Swedish policy maker)
Danish policy makers felt that in some instances people have a right
to change their minds based on historical precedent. They believed, for
instance, that policy makers should be allowed to alter their views if a
technology is deemed less safe than was previously believed. According
to a National Danish policy maker:
21

Kunreuther et al. (1994), supra note 1.
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Even if our predecessors were consulted on this matter,
times have changed. We had Three Mile Island and we have
had Chernobyl. Back then we did not know how unsafe
nuclear power actually was.... Of course, Barsebick is a safe
plant, but there is still a chance of a nuclear accident which
would have devastating consequences for Copenhagen.
Preference reversal was also shown by Swedes with regard to nuclear
power and some Danish policy makers emphasised this. For example, a
national policy maker said:
We really feel betrayed. A decision was made in 1988
that one Barsebi.ck reactor should be phased-out soon and
Swedish policy makers should stick to that. We made a
decision to build the Oresund bridge (bridge connecting
Copenhagen with Malm6) and we are not going to back
down due to public pressure.... We will continue to put
pressure on Sweden until they come up with a date to close
Barsebdck.
Overall, Danish policy makers rejected Sweden's position that process
fairness had been achieved as irrelevant, and they wanted to see more
attention being paid to outcome fairness. Their view appears to adhere
to the concept of preference reversal, as past decisions (to agree to
Barsebick being built 20KM from Copenhagen) are now being said to
have been made with incomplete knowledge (Three Mile Island and
Chernobyl accidents).
Swedish and DanishPublics
In general, residents of Malm6 understood how their counterparts
in Copenhagen felt, even though they themselves were more pronuclear.
While 81% of Malmd respondents were pro nuclear, 72% said they
appreciated Danish concerns about the Barsebdck plant, the majority
citing the fact that they live close to the plant (57%). A similar view was
seen in Copenhagen. Although 87% of respondents were antinuclear
(stating that Denmark should not have any nuclear power plants), 68%
understood why Swedes were more in favour of the Barsebdck plant
than Danes; the most common response (-28%) being that it was an
economic issue (e.g., too expensive to shut Barsebck down).
Sydkrafs View
The people interviewed at Sydkraft argued that process fairness had
been achieved and Danes could not complain about outcome fairness.
7 Risl: Health, Safety & Environment 135 [Spring 1996]

In this respect they agreed with Swedish policy makers. A senior
Sydkraft official summed up the company's view:
When we decided to build Barseback the Danes did not
complain.... Some [Danish] policy makers actually liked the
idea as there were plans to build nuclear power in Denmark,
and Danish utility companies also liked it as they saw an
opportunity to buy cheap electricity from the plant.... The
Danes did not complain about the plant until both reactors
were up and running. It was too late to complain then. A
large investment has been made, and if the reactors are to be
shut down we need to be compensated. We would not have
built two reactors at the Barsebiick site if we had realized
that the Danish public and policy makers would be so
adamant against nuclear power.... We can't take back what
has already happened. It would be unfair if we had to close
the plant. We have done nothing wrong.... The Barsebdck
plant has an exceptional safety record and is one of the best
nuclear reactors in the world.
There was consensus among officials interviewed that there could be
no compromise at this stage. The two reactors would be closed either
because of financial or safety problems (whichever came first), but not
by public opposition.
The Possibilityofa Compromise
On numerous occasions, Swedish policy makers have raised damage
to Sweden's soil and water from Danish acid rain in response to safety
and unfairness arguments about Barseback. This debate entered a new
phase in December 1993. At a Nordic Council of Ministers meeting in
Oslo, the Swedish and Danish Prime Ministers undertook to set up an
environmental working group to discuss both the possible phase-out of
the Barseback reactors and reducing acid rain. This would seem to be a
22
good example of procedural fairness using the tit-for-tat procedure.
On the surface, this appears to be fair, but it is unclear whether it is
practically and/or politically feasible, or indeed really fair. The majority
of Swedish policy makers are reluctant to reopen the debate. The socioeconomic consequences of an accelerated phase-out of the two reactors
was already discussed in detail in a 1987 Swedish Energy
Administration report, showing that the negative effects on southern
23
Sweden would be considerable.
22

Albin, supra note 4.
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Yet, this tit-for-tat solution, would be beneficial for Denmark as it
is planning, in any case, to substantially reduce SO2 emissions to meet
international environmental guidelines. In other words, the Danes are
incurring no extra expenses in agreeing to the swap.
Obviously, this solution is not entirely symmetrical. Swedes would
be forced to shut down two nuclear reactors, while the Danes would
only be required to install desulphurization units on their coal plants.
One fair (albeit impractical) tit-for-tat solution would be for
Swedes to close Barseback and Danes to close equal coal-fired capacity.
All policy makers found the idea ridiculous. As there would be a major
electricity shortage in both nations, they did not even wish to
comment. The suggestion was also put to residents in Copenhagen, and
the majority were in favour of this kind of tit-for-tat solution. Fifty-six
percent felt that it would be a good idea to remove equal amounts of
coal generating capacity for the nuclear capacity at Barseback. They felt
that policy makers in both nations should undertake this mainly
because the environment would then be cleaner (Table 1).24
Table 1.
Reasons why Danish respondents felt that a "tit-for-tat" swap is a good idea
(N = 56; respondents could give more than one answer; open ended question)
The environment would be cleaner
We have several energy alternatives
We have to do this
Will reduce acid rain
Use natural gas instead
Reduce carbon dioxide emissions
Other

Do not know

15
14
9
9
6
2
5

3

23 Swedish Energy Administration, Efter Tjernobyl-Fbrtida Avveckling av
Barsebackverket (1987).
24 This question was not asked in Sweden as the issue had not been discussed by the
press or policy makers prior to the Swedish interviews. For more, see Ragnar E.
Ldfstedt, The Evaluation of a Risk Communication Project: The Case of the
Barsebdck Nuclear Power Plant,forthcoming Energy Policy (1996).
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Conclusions and Policy Implications
The Barseback example shows that Swedish decision makers felt
their policies were justified on the basis of process fairness, while Danish
policy makers argued that process fairness was largely irrelevant because
of historical precedent (caused by a preference reversal from nuclear
power being seen as a necessary and good energy sources to a situation
where nuclear power was seen as dangerous and unnecessary) and now
felt that the plant as unjustified due to a violation of outcome fairness.
It is uncertain, however, if invoking fairness principles will indeed
help to solve this issue. Although the acid-rain-nuclear-power trade off,
is a good example of (tit-for-tat) procedural fairness, it is unlikely to be
practical. Unless new, commercially viable renewable energy sources can
be developed in both nations in the short-term, such actions would
result in a major shortage of electricity in both nations.
The implications of this study are two fold:
First, it suggests that the public in both nations (especially in
Denmark) were more rational and understanding of each other's view
points than were policy makers. Although this needs further study, it
indicates a possible role for public participation in resolving
transnational controversies.
Second, the study highlights the problems associated with
preference reversal, i. e., policy makers and the public changing views
concerning a disputed technology. As discussed above, Danish policy
makers were at first pronuclear while the public was indifferent. Only
after the two Barseback reactors were up and running, did the Danes
start to oppose Barseback actively. How a change in public opinion can
be addressed once a facility is up and running, for instance, is an
interesting area for future research.

